Duplicate for the personal files of A.W.D.

UNCLASSIFIED

229

HS/HC-400, item 9.
INT 743/1

Memorandum respecting Section 202 (Central Intelligence Agency) of the bill to provide for a National Defense Establishment.

Submitted by Allen W. Dulles

April 25, 1947

I.

To create an effective Central Intelligence Agency we must have in the key positions men who are prepared to make this a life work, not a mere casual occupation. Service in the Agency should not be viewed merely as a steppingstone to promotion in one of the armed services or other branches of the Government. The Agency should be directed by a relatively small but elite corps of men with a passion for anonymity and a willingness to stick at that particular job. They must find their reward primarily in the work itself, and in the service they render their government, rather than in public acclaim.

Intelligence work in time of peace differs fundamentally from that in time of war. In time of war military channels and military facilities, and consequently military personnel, can effectively be employed in far greater measure than in peace time. In time of peace intelligence with respect to foreign countries must come largely through civilian channels.

Because of its glamour and mystery overemphasis is generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, namely the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and by secret agents. During war this form of intelligence takes on added importance but in time of peace the bulk of intelligence can be obtained through overt channels, through our diplomatic and consular missions, and our military, naval and air attaches in the normal and proper course of their work. It can also be

HS 400 ITEM 9

ALSO SEE: HS/HC-72

UNCLASSIFIED

STATINTL Jul 8

obtained through the world press, the radio, and through the many thousands of Americans, business and professional men and American residents of foreign countries, who are naturally and normally brought in touch with what is going on in those countries. A proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal and above-board means would supply us with over 80 per cent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy. An important balance must be supplied by secret intelligence, which includes what we now often refer to as "Magic".

II.

I believe that the agency which is to be entrusted with assembling and analyzing intelligence should be predominantly civilian rather than military, and under civilian leadership.

Whoever takes the post of Director of Central Intelligence should make that his life work. If previously a military man, he should not look forward to resuming a position in one of the armed services. The same should be true of his top staff. Whatever may have been their previous professions, whether military or civilian, once they take high position in the Central Intelligence organization they should, if military, divest themselves of their rank as soldiers, sailors or airmen and, as it were, "take the cloth" of the intelligence service.

The success of the FBI has been due not only to the ability of the director and the high qualities of his chief assistants, but to the fact that that director has been on that particular job for a sufficient period of years to build up public confidence, an "esprit de corps" in his organization, and a high prestige. We should seek the same results for our

intelligence service, which will operate in the foreign field, and on items of foreign information.

I do not suggest that the legislation should lay down a hard and fast rule that the chief of the intelligence agency must come from civilian life. Certainly there are many men of military training who are competent to hold that job. But if a military man takes the job, he should operate from that time on as a civilian. Further, he must be assured, subject to good performance, a specified term of duty, which should be subject to extension as long as he carried out his task efficiently. Appointment as Chief of Central Intelligence should be somewhat comparable to appointment to high judicial office, and should be equally free from interference due to political changes. In fact, the duties the Chief will have to perform will call for the judicial temperament in high degree. An appointee must gain that critical faculty which can only come of long experience and profound knowledge to enable him to separate the wheat from the chaff in the volume of information which will pass through his office.

Of course, the Central Intelligence Agency should also have attached to it a substantial number of men from the armed forces as well as from civilian life, many of whom will not make it a life career but who can perform useful functions for a term of years.

Much of our thinking relating to an intelligence agency is colored by our recent dramatic war experiences. Intelligence work in time of peace will require other techniques, other personnel, and will have rather different objectives. The prime objectives today are not solely strategic or military, important as these may be. They are scientific - in the field of atomic energy, guided missiles, supersonic aircraft, and the

UNCLASSIFIED

like. They are political and social. We must deal with the problem of conflicting ideologies as democracy faces communism, not only in the relations between Soviet Russia and the countries of the West, but in the internal political conflicts within the countries of Europe, Asia, and South America. For example, it may well be more important to know the trend of Russian communism and the views of individual members of the Polit Bureau than it would be to have information as to the locations of particular Russian divisions.

Having this conception of the task of a Central Intelligence Agency, I am skeptical as to the wisdom or adequacy of the provisions in the Bill to provide for a National Defense Establishment with respect to Central Intelligence. These provisions seem to me to set up what, in effect, is likely to become merely a coordinating agency for the military intelligence services, G-2, A-2, ONI. This is useful, and this function should be performed by the Agency, but it is not enough.

The constant changes in the chiefs of the military intelligence services has crippled their efficiency and lessened their prestige. As these services are a part of a professional career, of which intelligence is only one segment (and too often it has been a stepchild), such changes are somewhat inevitable. But this precedent should not be carried over to the new Central Intelligence Agency. There provision must be made for permanence and continuity. And yet the Central Intelligence Authority, heretofore based on Presidential order, will have had three heads in the space of one short year. The two men who up to now have been the heads of that Agency were both extremely able, devoted and competent men, but no man can do much in this most difficult field in a few months. Constant change destroys the morale, and prevents the long-range planning

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 743/5

which must be the task of a properly functioning intelligence agency.

Hence I would recommend that any legislation provide long-term tenure for the chief of the Agency, with the establishment of a precedent that his chief subordinates should also have that degree of permanence which is necessary to insure team play between the chief and his immediate assistants. The chief should not have men imposed upon him for political or other like reasons. He should have the right to pass upon his assistants. The legislation should provide that the chief and his immediate assistants, so long as they are attached to the Central Intelligence Agency, should act in a civilian and not in a military capacity.

III.

Under the legislation as proposed, the Central Intelligence Agency is to operate under the National Security Council, the stated purpose of which is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of foreign and military policies, and to enable the military services and other agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security." This Council will have at least six members, and possibly more, subject to Presidential appointment. From its composition it will be largely military, although the Secretary of State will be a member. If precedent is any guide, it seems unlikely, in view of the burden of work upon all the members of this Council, that it will prove to be an effective working body which will meet frequently, or which could give much supervisory attention to a Central Intelligence Agency. It would seem preferable that the Chief of Central Intelligence should report, as at present, to a smaller body, of which the Secretary of State would be the chairman, and which

INT 743/c

would include the Secretary of National Defense, and a representative of the President, with the right reserved to the Secretaries of State and of National Defense to be represented on this small board by deputies, who should have at least the rank of Assistant Secretary. And this Board must really meet and assume the responsibility for advising and counseling the Director of Intelligence, and assure the proper liaison between the Agency and these two Departments and the Executive.

IV.

In time of peace intelligence will probably be of more importance in the day by day operations of the Department of State than any other agency of the Government, even the Department of National Defense. Further, in time of peace, intelligence can only be properly collected if there are the closest working arrangements with the Department of State, as the bulk of the intelligence collected abroad will come through the facilities of that Department.

The proposed intelligence setup in the draft legislation is overweighted on the side of the military department of the Government, as contrasted with the State Department. This is natural because it appears in a Bill for our National Defense Establishment This fact, however, should not blind us to the realities of the situation.

The State Department, irrespective of the form in which the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect and process its own information as a basis for the day by day conduct of its work. The armed services intelligence agencies will do likewise. But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine

policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. It should try to get at the hard facts on which others must determine policy. The warnings which might well have pointed to the attack on Pearl Harbor were largely discounted by those who had already concluded that the Japanese must inevitably strike elsewhere. The warnings which reportedly came to Hitler of our invasion of North Africa were laughed aside. Hitler thought he knew we didn't have the ships to do it. It is impossible to provide any system which will be proof against the human frailty of intellectual stubbornness. Every individual suffers from that. All we can do is to see that we have created the best possible mechanism to get the unvarnished facts before the policy makers, and to get it there in time.

V.

Any Central Intelligence Agency (in addition to having access to the intelligence collected by the State Department and the armed services, to intelligence gained through intercepted messages, open and deciphered alike, and from the results of its own secret and overt intelligence operations) must have a corps of the most competent men which this country can produce to evaluate and correlate the intelligence obtained, and to present it, in proper form, to the interested Government Departments, in most cases to the State Department, in many cases to the Department of National Defense, or to both.

It is important to avoid splitting up and dissipating t personnel available for this work through having overall specialized intelligence evaluating agencies in both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. If close working

relations are established between the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department - as is essential if the Agency is to function properly - it would seem desirable, for reasons of economy and efficiency, that the task of evaluation should be delegated to the Central Intelligence Agency without, of course, affecting the work in the geographical and other divisions of the State Department. This would mean that the specialized intelligence agency within the State Department should be coordinated with, or amalgamated into, the branch of the Central Intelligence Agency devoted to the analysis and evaluation of intelligence.

VI.

In addition to these basic considerations, the Central Intelligence Agency should have the following powers and attributes:

1. Control its own personnel but with the right to co-opt personnel from other Departments of the Government, with the consent of the head of the Department in question but without affecting the rank, civil service status or pay of the employee assigned for temporary duty.

2. Have its own appropriations but with the possibility of supplementing these appropriations from available funds of the Department of State or the Department of National Defense under conditions to be provided by law, in order to carry on certain special operations which may, from time to time, be deemed necessary by the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of National Defense.

3. Have exclusive jurisdiction to carry out secret intelligence operations.

4. Have access to all intelligence information relating to foreign countries received by all Departments of the Government, including "Magic".

5. Be the recognized agency for dealing with the central intelligence agencies of other countries.

6. Have its operations and personnel protected by "official secrets" legislation which would provide adequate penalties for breach of security.

VII.

It has truthfully been said that intelligence is our first line of defense. The European countries more immediately exposed to danger in the past have realized this, and have spared no pains to develop adequate intelligence services. Among them the British have had signal success, and this success, in no small part, has been responsible for pulling them through periods of the direst danger. The British system has behind it a long history of quiet effective performance, based on a highly trained personnel with years of service and great technical ability. In this country we have the raw material for building the greatest intelligence service in the world. But to accomplish this we must make it a respectable, continuing, and adequately remunerated career. The personnel need not be very numerous. The operation of the service must be neither flamboyant nor over-shrouded with the mystery and abracadabra which the amateur detective likes to assume.

With the proper legislative backing, a correct technical setup, and adequate leadership, all that is required for success is hard work, discriminating judgment, and common sense. Americans can be found who are not lacking in these qualities.